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THE EXCLUSION OF Y2K RELATED LOSSES
FROM AVIATION INSURANCE POLICIES-
PRACTICALITIES, POLITICS, AND LEGALITIES
ToNy PYNE*
TN EARLY 1999, Australian multimillionaire entrepreneur and
adventurer Dick Smith privately predicted that the Y2K bug
would come to nothing and, as usual, he was essentially correct.
An estimated $A920 billion was spent worldwide combating the
bug, and now the recriminations are beginning. Was it a con?
Was the public duped? Was it all a waste of money? Even if it
was justified, does it withstand scrutiny on a cost/benefit basis?
Whatever the answer, the aviation industry is one area that took
this issue very seriously given the possible consequences. As is
commonly known, many aircraft did not fly as the clock rolled
over to 2000 (for lack of bookings!).
I was "lucky" enough to have a multidisciplinary involvement
in this issue as an aircraft owner, a member of the Board of Aus-
tralia's Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), and as an avia-
tion lawyer advising Australia's major airlines and insurers. I will
deal with some issues arising in those roles below.
First, what was the Y2K bug supposed to be? The simplistic
explanation most of us are familiar with is that many computers
were programmed to identify the year portion of dates by two
digits with the result that they may not have been able to differ-
entiate between 1920 and 2020, for example, and/or would
read the rollover to year 2000 as 1900. However, this was only
the tip of the possible iceberg, especially in an aviation context.
Potential aviation-related Y2K problems had a number of critical
dates including:
* LL.M. (Lond.)F.R.AE.S., Consultant in aviation law, Minter Ellison,
Melbourne and Brisbane, Australia; Member of the Board of Civil Aviation Safety
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AUGUST 21, 1999: Global Positioning Systems (GPS) could
have suffered end of week rollover; i.e. run out of weeks, which
they use to keep track of time. When the U.S. Air Force devel-
oped the GPS in the 1970s, the timing cycle was restricted to
1,024 weeks. Accordingly, it was predicted that some older units
would run out of time at midnight on August 21, 1999, and GPS
receivers would begin to look for satellites where they were lo-
cated on January 6, 1980. The August date came and went with
few difficulties-only the oldest (generally marine) equipment
had irreversible problems. A few units took some amount of
time to locate themselves on August 22, but eventually were
able to accurately do so. The next block of 1,024 weeks expires
in mid-2019.
SEPTEMBER 9, 1999 (9/9/99): some systems allocated 9999 as
the end of a cycle or used it for miscellaneous or unallocated
items. Errors on such systems were expected on this date as
equipment ran to 9999 and halted, but in an aviation context,
this did not materialize.
JANUARY 1, 2000: as with many systems, there was concern
that they might fail as the date rolled over to the new
millennium.
FEBRUARY 29, 2000: when Pope Gregory X1II introduced the
Gregorian calendar,' it provided for a turn of the century leap
year only once every 400 years. Leap years generally fall in a
year that has a number divisible by four. An exception is when
the number is divisible by 100, unless it is also divisible by 400.
Accordingly, 2000 is a leap year, whereas 1700, 1800, 1900, and
2100 are not. Programs that cannot differentiate 2000 as a leap
year could have failed on the above date or caused downstream
calculation problems.
OCTOBER 10, 2000: this is the first date when many systems
may need and use a full eight digit date length.
DECEMBER 31, 2000: related to the leap year problem, some
programs will not recognize 2000 as having 366 days, and so will
have problems at the end of the year.
There may be other ongoing problems with systems which al-
locate dates in the future, such as reservations systems, records
of product shelf-lives, maintenance cycle records, and systems
It is interesting to note that the Gregorian calendar was only adopted by
Great Britain in 1752, Russia in 1917, and Greece in 1923.
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used for preparing business and production forecasts. Subtrac-
tion problems could show up in a week, a month, or a year or
more into the future. Even Bill Gates has predicted ongoing
problems.2 For instance, hidden errors in spreadsheet data and
databases (such as financial databases) may take some time to be
felt, and software that manipulates dates for calculations can
have newly compliant Y2K data affected by any remaining non-
compliant old data.
Newspaper headlines on and afterJanuary 1, 2000 trumpeted
that the bug did not bite, which was generally true. No wide-
spread chaos or failure of systems occurred, and those with
twenty-twenty hindsight immediately "predicted" that there
never would have been a major problem anyway, even if reme-
dial work had not been done. (The evidence of financial institu-
tions debunks this theory). Claims were made that it had all
been a waste of money. The public certainly seemed to take a
disinterested attitude with little panic, and even the large
amounts of cash printed in anticipation of a bank withdrawal
rush was not used. It was reported that cash withdrawals from
UK banks on December 31, 1999 (53 million pounds) were not
as great as on the same date in 1998 (60.7 million pounds).
Concerns that there would be a run on gasoline supplies in the
United States immediately prior to the rollover did not eventu-
ate. However, there certainly were glitches on the rollover date,
some potentially serious.
In Japan, a monitoring unit at one nuclear reactor failed and
a temperature alarm sounded at another. Minor problems were
reported at several U.S. nuclear power stations but were easily
rectified, and some were ultimately considered not to be Y2K-
related. Automatic fault detection programs at ground liaison
stations for French Syracuse II military satellite systems were af-
fected, but apparently with "no operational effect;" the system is
the main link with French forces in Kosovo. NASA suffered "mi-
nor anomalies," but they did not disrupt operations. Similar
problems occurred at the U.S. Oak Ridge National Laboratories
nuclear weapons plant. Databases at two Spanish nuclear power
plants experienced problems but were shut down and replaced
by backup systems. In Israel, government services, the financial
sector, and the Defense Department had significant system
problems.
2 THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 3, 2000, at 1. A major aircraft manufacturer is con-
cerned about problems as far out as 2038.
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The Gambia suffered widespread power failures, although
again, they may not have been Y2K related. Hong Kong motor-
ist breath-testing equipment malfunctioned. An Australian Y2K
countdown clock went haywire. There were minor problems in
Malaysian hospitals. In South Korea, newborn babies were re-
corded as being 100 years old. Some banking and government
computer problems were experienced in China. A New York
video library fined a customer $139,000 for returning a video
100 years overdue!
A U.S. stock exchange discovered some incorrect stock price
values, including one shown as $3,500 per share instead of $35.
A German bank erroneously credited a customer with DM3.9
billion. Some Windows-based computers reverted to 1/1/80 in-
stead of 1/1/00, but "it was easily fixed." The U.S. Pentagon's
top secret spy satellite operations were blinded by problems with
ground-based computers, despite the Pentagon having spent
$3.8 billion to upgrade systems for 2000. Information was un-
readable (and lost) for a three hour period and degraded for
three days.' The New Zealand TAB betting shops had a bumper
season with punters "investing" the cash they had withdrawn
from their banks as a millennium precaution. The computer in
the library of a Sydney law firm dated items 1900 instead of
2000. This was not an uncommon problem and was shared by
the Jacksonville Electric Authority in Jacksonville, Florida and
NTUC in Singapore. A number of other systems printed 1980,
1982, or 1984 instead of the correctJanuary 1, 2000 date. Air-
services Australia had a failure of GPS time input into the state
of the art TAAATS computerized ATC system, notwithstanding
pre-2000 remedial work. Feed from the radar timing field,
which uses time but not date, was patched into the TAAATS sys-
tem, and the system continued to operate. Powering up aircraft
Honeywell FMS systems for the first time in the new millennium
produced a date error message, although the systems func-
tioned satisfactorily and were easily fixed.
There were some easily fixed engine trend monitoring system
problems. Some dialysis units needed corrective action to set
the calendar date. The computer-regulated clock controlling
church bells in a town in northern Italy went out of sync and
caused the bells to chime at 6:15 a.m. on New Year's Day. When
the system was checked, the computer had recorded the date of
" Chris Thornton, WrnY2K?, FLIGHT INTERNATIONAL,Jan. 11, 2000, at 5, availa-
ble in 2000 WL 9380399.
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1980 instead of 2000. Otherwise, Italy appears to have been re-
markably Y2K problem-free.
The United States suffered a Y2K-related technical difficulty
with the distribution of NOTAMs. The weather message switch-
ing center in Atlanta, Georgia failed to recognize and process
certain types of NOTAMs because of a software problem involv-
ing a failure to recognize years ending in 0 in the NOTAM time
and date code. The North American Electric Reliability Council
reported that several electric utilities in North America had mi-
nor glitches with synchronization features of the clocks used in
their energy management system computers, albeit a non-criti-
cal part of the system. In the United States, emergency 911 sys-
tems broke down during Y2K testing, leading to an increase in
the number of police personnel on duty to compensate for mal-
functions in the system. Low level wind shear alert systems
failed at the Tampa, Denver, Atlanta, Orlando, Chicago O'Hare,
and St. Louis airports during the rollover and displayed an error
message. Normal operations were restored within two hours.
Similar installations at Toledo, Lansing, Charleston, and Moline
also had problems, but operations were not affected. A web site
operated by the U.S. Naval Observatory, the nation's official
timekeeper, marked the date asJanuary 1, 19100! However, the
problem did not affect the master clock in Washington, D.C.,
which has been keeping the nation's time since 1845. Kavouras
graphic weather display systems at flight service stations in six-
teen locations around the United States failed about ten min-
utes after the rollover, due to the data not updating properly.
The system sent data bearing the date 2010, resulting in rejec-
tion of national weather service data and incorrect updates in
the weather system. Service was restored in about ten minutes.
The payroll computer at the Deutsche Oper in Berlin wiped
out government subsidies for families with children by wrongly
computing the children's ages. It treated children born in 1990
as 90 years old and automatically stopped their child allowance.
The Apple Macintosh version of the Dutch Postbank's Gironet
software was not Y2K compliant, resulting in customers not be-
ing able to use all promised features.
There do not appear to have been any major aviation-related
problems, even in countries which had been ranked at the low-
est level of preparedness and in which ATC and radar problems
had been forecast. Many possible explanations for this exist.
For example, aviation equipment generally only comes from a
few manufacturers, who ensured their products were function-
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ing properly either pre- or post-sale. Many ATC systems are still
manual systems (paper strips and shrimp boats as was the case
even in Australia until a year or two ago). Ground based naviga-
tional aids such as NDB, VOR, and even ILS have no or little
reliance on computers; the aviation system is always in contin-
gency mode-aircraft have two or more engines and two or
more flight crew, extra fuel is carried to guard against bad
weather and diversions, and aviation systems are, by design, fail
safe. The industry is used to contingency planning and, at least
at major passenger operational level, is always in recovery mode
to deal with service glitches. Accordingly, the concept of Y2K
was taken in stride by aviation regulators and operators.
In addition, partly due to remediation efforts in the industry,
it was predicted that the aviation industry would not suffer from
airplanes falling out of the sky, but might have problems with
business continuity resulting from Y2K issues with elevators, se-
curity systems, airport lighting, baggage, x-rays, car parks, flight
information, aerobridges, passport readers, and check-in sys-
tems. In actuality, problems even in these areas were minimal.4
Vast amounts of money were spent on Y2K preparation and
remediation work-$A920 billion worldwide, $A12 billion in
Australia, some $A147 million and $A87 million respectively by
Australia's two major airlines, $A2.3 billion by the Australian
government (calculated to be the equivalent of about 50 years
expenditure on medical research), $A115 million by the Com-
monwealth Bank of Australia, and $A400 million by Australia's
major telecommunications company, Telstra. The U.S. govern-
ment reputedly spent $100 billion.
The Small Business Association of Australia labeled the prob-
lem and expenditure as "the greatest con trick foisted upon bus-
iness, ''5 while, according to Fidel Castro, it was all a capitalist
plot to boost spending on computer technology.6
Others point to the fact that there were no Y2K disruptions to
key sectors in countries such as Cuba, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, Russia,7 China, Bulgaria, Vietnam, other areas of Asia,
, David Learmotunt, Aerospace Beats Y2K Bug, FLIGT INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 11,
2000, at 11, available in 2000 WL 9380386. According to Pierre Jeanniot, Director
General of IATA, "No Y2K related incidents were reported from any of the eight
regional monitoring centres jointly operated by IATA and (ICAO)." Id.
5 Tr: AusmrRL\LIAN Jan. 5, 2000, at 3.
6 TIlE Aus'rR AIN, Jan. 4, 2000, at 6.
7 David Learmount, Russia Plans Manual Y2K Overnide, FuCGtrr INTERNATIONAL,
Dec. 22, 1999, at 13, available in 1999 WL 29616763. Valdinir Adreyer, director of
774
2000] THE EXCLUSION OF Y2K RELATED LOSSES
and in southern and eastern Europe to suggest that the issue
was not really significant and that western countries were ripped
off. However, three minor computers in the United States,
known to have problems and deliberately left running, crashed
completely at the millennium changeover. The truth of the
matter probably lies somewhere inbetween. Professor Anthony
Finkelstein of University College London noted:
The public was ignorant, the IT consultants were drawn by the
lure of filthy lucre, the science policy experts were seized with a
mad cow effect in which their advice ceased to be rational, the
nutcases were declaring the end of the world and a sensible, em-
pirically founded approach to the risk was lost.'
Professor Finkelstein reportedly warned against Y2K hysteria a
year ago. Others, with twenty-twenty hindsight, now say that
"[i] t was never going to be a disaster, with things like electricity
and water failing [but it] is going to be about [minor] problems
for business."' Most observers considered that the work had to
be done or no one would have dealt with companies that failed
to check and fix their systems.
Perhaps the most balanced comment is that of The Economist
"Sensible risk management meant fixing the show stoppers not
fixing everything. That distinction was frequently lost on politi-
cians who wanted to avoid blame for inaction, and ignored by IT
consultants, who found bug squashing a handy source of
revenue."10
As long as the risk was real, and I believe it was, I tend to look
at the matter from an insurance perspective in that the money
spent was effectively a premium, and the hazard "insured"
against did not occur. Policyholders make the same type of de-
cision every day, and that is how underwriters make their
money. Whether we got value for money in the present in-
stance, I do not know. In my view, the safety aspects in the avia-
tion arena made the effort essential. As a Telstra Y2K manager
reportedly said, "it's a bit like immunizing your child against po-
Russia's Federal Service of Air Transport, reported that only half of Russia's 2,470
computers that needed adjustment would be ready by the rollover date, and the
operators would merely use manual override. See id.
8 THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 3, 2000, at 1.
9 THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 4, 2000, at 13 (quoting Graeme Inchley, Australian
Federal Y2K program chief).
10 Tuc AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 11, 2000, at 32.
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lio - are you then disappointed when the disease does not
occur?"11
Whatever the reality, a number of benefits have been claimed
for the effort. Many organizations have thought long and hard
about their computer systems for the first time, cleared out old
code, and invested in new, updated equipment. The opportu-
nity was taken to clean up poorly implemented IT systems, en-
sure data integrity, and compile inventories of technological
assets. Much of the $A12 billion spent in Australia was, logically,
for new equipment rather than fixing old systems. The ground-
work was laid for a possibly wiser approach to technological
scares, in the future taking sensible precautions but not panick-
ing. There was unprecedented sharing of information within
industries, of which aviation is a prime example. This is particu-
larly significant given the present globalization of the industry.
Y2K was a good dry run for a globalized industry disaster plan.
Y2K problems were found by many organizations, and had they
not been fixed, there would have been problems especially in
telecommunications (in Australia regarding mobiles, call cen-
ters, and billing). The position was similar with banks, with the
Commonwealth Bank of Australia having to replace its entire
credit card and check encoding systems. Some proactive organi-
zations used Y2K as an investment strategy. For example, Aus-
tralian power generation systems put in a fourth level of
communications redundancy with a new satellite strategy. Addi-
tionally, non-Y2K related problems were found, identified, and
fixed. Organizations were forced to make changes that will re-
position them for the twenty-first century and provide a founda-
tion to deal with new issues such as GST (in Australia), e-
commerce, and the internet community. It prompted develop-
ment of comprehensive disaster plans and better communica-
tions between boardroom and computer room, encouraging
board members to learn about IT and the role of computer
technology in their businesses. It encouraged better system inte-
gration in the aviation industry and improved knowledge of sys-
tem recovery. Finally, having experienced August 21st,
September 9th, January 1st, and February 9th without major is-
sues, there is now a higher level of confidence in respect of Y2K
matters (although some say that only 5% of problems could
have been expected to have been experienced to date).
I THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 11, 2000, at 13.
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My own Y2K involvement as an aircraft owner is easy to deal
with-nil to report. My Piper Twin Comanche was built in 1970
and, although it is well equipped to IFR charter standard, not
even the navaids are computerized. Similarly, much of the Aus-
tralian general aviation fleet uses less complex aircraft with less
complex systems and little date dependency. As indicated ear-
lier, Australia did not suffer any significant ATC or other avia-
tion (or even aviation support) service failures, and my aircraft
was lucky enough to escape the more serious non-Y2K problem
of contaminated fuel. I also did not suffer a supplier Y2K
problem.
As a member of the CASA Board and then chairman of the
Board Audit Committee, I know that we took Y2K issues very
seriously, both in respect of our own internal computer systems
and in respect of external operators' systems. As CASA also
deals with the compulsory insurance requirements for charter
and RPT passenger carrying operations under Part IVA of
(Commonwealth) Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Act 1959,2
as amended, we were also involved in aviation insurance issues,
discussed below.
While CASA itself does not have any immediate flight safety
critical systems, we do have licensing, registration, and surveil-
lance systems. The Board's concern with respect to internal sys-
tems was to ensure that management dealt adequately with the
issue and to monitor progress, particularly in respect of critical
information systems such as licensing and medical records. At
the end of the day we were able to sign off to the government
that this information could not be lost or corrupted for Y2K
reasons.
Although in many senses, Y2K in relation to operators was an
industry issue rather than a regulatory one, CASA took a signifi-
cant, largely educational role as many in the industry did not
have relevant knowledge. The major airlines, major airport op-
erators, and others were well ahead of the game and were imple-
menting their own strategies, investigations, and procedures.
Yet, many charter and third level operators and some mainte-
nance organizations needed assistance.
Accordingly, CASA published a range of educational material,
including a 124-page book entitled AVIATION Y2K-AN OPERA-
TORS GUIDE TO THE YEAR 2000 READINESS AND CONTINGENCY
1 Civil Aviation (Carrier's Liability) Act 1959 § WA (Commonwealth) [herein-
after CAA].
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PLANNING. CASA also ran or participated in seminars on the is-
sue, particularly in an aviation context. The material explained
the basics, gave relevant examples, and provided checklists and
help lines, and even details of available Y2K tax concessions, le-
gal, and insurance issues.
Other elements of the campaign consisted of promulgating
an Airworthiness Advisory Circular (AACI-104, 'Year 2000 com-
pliance for aircraft and related systems") and the Australian
standard on Y2K compliance; establishing a Y2K information
telephone service to answer industry enquiries; sponsoring a na-
tional conference on Y2K in aviation; publishing a series of arti-
cles in the aviation media and occasional fax newsletters on Y2K
issues; and researching typical operators to discover the kinds of
Y2K issues which needed to be addressed and using the results
as a guide for subsequent education.
Relying largely on (Commonwealth) Year 2000 Information
Disclosure Act 1999 legislation designed to aid the voluntary dis-
closure and exchange of Y2K information and remediation ef-
forts (and providing protection from civil actions in relation
thereto), CASA required all operators and providers of commer-
cial aviation services in Australia, including maintenance organi-
zations, airlines, charter operators, flying schools and airports,
to complete a Statement of Accomplishment confirming that
safety would not be compromised by computer-related or equip-
ment date rollover problems. We also relied on section 28BE of
(Commonwealth) Civil Aviation Act 1988, which requires AOC
holders to take all steps necessary to ensure that every activity
undertaken pursuant to the AOC is done with a reasonable de-
gree of care and diligence.
The Statement of Accomplishment, required to be completed
by September 30, 1999, called for an assurance from the rele-
vant operators that "safety will not be compromised by com-
puter or equipment date rollover problems,"13 based on Y2K
measures taken and information generally available to the oper-
ator on the date of the statement. CASA conducted an audit of
a selection of operators' statements.
Statements were received within a reasonable time from all
but thirty operators nationwide. Those thirty were issued no-
tices requiring them to show cause why their AOC or operating
authorities should not be suspended or cancelled. This elicited
statements from all but two operators, and statements from
13 Statement of Accomplishment, 1999.
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these were eventually obtained. Statements were obtained from
international airlines serving Australia via the Department of
Transport & Regional Services and the Department of Foreign
Affairs & Trade.
The Statement of Accomplishment approach was very success-
ful, and the United States, United Kingdom, and New Zealand
civil aviation authorities followed this approach.
Notwithstanding Dick Smith's private view, the Board, like
many others in our position, treated Y2K issues extremely seri-
ously in the interests of aviation safety. While some took the
view that major issues would be failure of baggage carousel
power supplies and similar problems (and were ultimately
proven correct), we just did not know and, as a prudent Board,
could not take (and did not contemplate taking) the risk. As an
editorial in The Australian newspaper for January 3, 2000 noted,
"[i]t is easy, with hindsight, to suggest that the Western world in
particular overestimated the potential for Y2K catastrophe. Yet
a wait-and-see approach to the Y2K bug was never an option.
The risks were too great."14
Insurers became concerned about the potential for Y2K re-
lated losses and claims at an early stage. Given past losses in the
London market in particular, the UK Treasury made it clear
that insurance organizations had to "actively monitor and con-
trol aggregate Millennium exposure or otherwise face signifi-
cant penalties."' 5 UK authorities and various U.S. insurance
commissioners actively ensured that solvency margins were
maintained.
This general concern manifested itself in an aviation context
primarily through a joint document issued by Lloyds Aviation
Underwriters' Association and Aviation Insurance Offices Asso-
ciation entitled "Millennium Management-Date Change Rec-
ognition in the Aviation Insurance Market." 6 The LAUA Note
was accompanied by a proposed Aerospace Date Recognition
Conformity Questionnaire, for completion by insured operators,
and initial drafts of a proposed Date Recognition Exclusion
Clause (AVN2000) and proposed draft partial writebacks, Date
Recognition Limited Coverage Clauses AVN2001 (stated in the
14 THE AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 3, 2000, at 11.
15 SeeJames Healy-Pratt, To Protect and Serve: Aviation Insurance and New Millen-
nium, 24 AiR LAw 204, 205 (1999).
16 See Lloyds Aviation Underwriters' Assoc. & Aviation Insurance Offices Assoc.,
Millennium Management Date Change Recognition in the Aviation Insurance Market,
Apr. 22, 1998 [hereinafter LAUA Note].
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LAUA Note to be applicable to hull and aircraft liability insur-
ance) and AVN2002 (stated to be applicable to non-aircraft lia-
bility policies). The LAUA Note sought to
remind intermediaries and policyholders of certain basic insur-
ance theory and practice [the relevant premise of which] is con-
cerned with FORTUITY [which] concept requires (unless it has
been specifically agreed to the contrary by the relevant insurers)
that a fortuitous event must first occur in order to give rise to a
valid claim under a policy of insurance.... Given the extensive
global debate on the subject of Y2K computer problems, it is
clearly apparent the topic does not meet the criteria of a fortuity.
Rather it is a well known, well described BUSINESS RISK. It fol-
lows from this that unless specifically agreed by insurers to cover
these perils, any possible Y2K risks or liability arising therefrom
are NOT COVERED under existing insurance policies.' 7
On receipt of this material, I advised clients that whilst it is
indeed a recognized principle of insurance law that, unless or
even if otherwise agreed, insurance is only available against for-
tuities, not certainties nor, probably, near certainties, and whilst
the date recognition problem was well known, exactly where
and when it would strike remained fortuitous. I was of the view
that it was just not known what would occur on January 1, 2000
(or on the other relevant dates) and how any individual com-
puter equipment would react. I considered the LAUA Note to
be overly dogmatic and its description of the Y2K problem as "a
well-known, well-described BUSINESS RISK' to be an oversimpli-
fication.' 8 Even the term "risk" implies insurability.
Derrington and Ashton suggest that the fortuity principle gen-
erally only operates to vitiate the insured's coverage when the
damage is actually subjectively intended by him, there being "no
rule of construction excluding from the cover loss caused by the
wilful act or the fault of the insured, providing that it does not
involve intentional loss."' 9 Coverage is intended to provide
against a contingency and not deliberate damage. However, an
intention sufficient to vitiate coverage may be inferred where
the result is clearly foreseeable, 2 or the conduct of the insured
may have been so grave that he courted the result and to that
17 Id. The document went on to introduce the accompanying material alleg-
edly "[h]aving explicitly clarified that current policies do not cover Y2K liabili-
ties." Id.
18 Id.
19 DERRINGTON & ASITON, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 8 (1990).
20) See Hardy v. Motor Insurers' Bureau, [1964] 2 QB 745.
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extent is regarded as having intended it.2' Whilst even a consid-
erable degree of inadvertent negligence may not produce an in-
ference of intent,'22 if one completely ignored the Y2K issue,
insurers would probably be entitled to deny indemnity under
the policy. However, the issue in my view was not clear, and I
considered the view advanced in the LAUA Note should not
necessarily be taken at face value.
The seminal definition of insurance in Prudential Insurance Co.
v. IRC23 requires that there be uncertainty as to whether the in-
sured event will happen or (principally in relation to life insur-
ance) when it will happen. In the Y2K case, both arms of the
test may be satisfied to some extent, but there remained an ele-
ment of contingency.
The correct position was probably the middle ground: if no
steps were taken by an insured to seek to identify and eliminate
computer date recognition problems, then any such problems
which manifested themselves would not be a fortuity or contin-
gency. Conversely, if rigorous testing and elimination steps
were taken by the insured, and problems still arose, such claims
may be fortuitous and should be covered by policies in the ab-
sence of a specific exclusion not withstanding the LAUA view.
However, the reality was that the placing of AVN2000 on policies
would be non-negotiable, the LAUA Note indicating that avia-
tion underwriters would require AVN2000 to be incorporated in
policies at renewal or on attachment after June 1, 1998.
I note in passing that, effective July 1, 1997, the Insurance
Contracts Act 1984 applied to all aviation insurance policies the
proper law of which is that of Australia. 4 Section 46 of the ICA
provides that an insurer cannot rely on pre-existing defects and
imperfections where the insured or a reasonable person in the
circumstances would not be aware of them, either to exclude or
limit liability. 25 This also raised the issue of whether the Y2K
problem generally is sufficient for insurers to use an endorse-
ment such as AVN2000, or whether the insured must know of
the actual defect. Other relevant ICA provisions included those
concerning utmost good faith, notice provisions, and section 54,
21 See Devlin v. Co-operative Fire & Cas. Co. (1977) 3 A.L.R.2d 212 (Austl.).
22 See McDougall v Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co., [1969] 78 DLR3d 102 (Can.).
23 [1904] 2 KB 658 .
24 Insurance Contracts Act, 1984 (Commonwealth) [hereinafter ICA] as was
amended in 1997: by Financial Laws Amendment Act, 1997 § 9(3)
(Commonwealth).
25 See ICA § 46, supra note 24.
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which requires that the breach of any policy exclusion that is
relied on by an insurer to deny indemnity must be causally re-
lated to the loss.
There was nothing in most aviation hull/all risks liability poli-
cies which excluded insurers' liability to indemnify for Y2K-
originating loss, damage, or liability, notwithstanding the sug-
gestion in the LAUA Note that "any possible Y2K risks or liability
arising therefrom are NOT COVERED under existing insurance
policies," and that the note had "explicitly clarified that current
policies do not cover Y2K liabilities."26 The statement in the
LAUA note that AVN2000 "makes clear that no cover applies," 7
suggests that, contrary to the LAUA contention, that was not al-
ready clear from policies. However, the reality was that
AVN2000 would be added to policy renewals.
The Conformity Questionnaire was a formidable and signifi-
cant document inquiring in some detail into each operator's
Y2K status and actions being taken to prepare for the millen-
nium. The Conformity Questionnaire was extremely wide-
ranging in that operators effectively had to reply not only for
themselves, but also with regard to the preparedness of suppli-
ers and others with whom they had arrangements, "including
without limitation" suppliers, subcontractors, and contractual
indemnities. The questions were very broad, and some of them
were almost impossible to answer in the negative.
More particularly, the initial draft of the Conformity Ques-
tionnaire proposed that operators sign off under a warranty to
the effect that all reasonably necessary steps had been taken to
ensure that answers were true, that material facts had not been
omitted, and that the operator agreed that material provided in
the questionnaire "shall form part of the basis of any subsequent
contract of insurance.12 ' As answers to some of the questions
would not be known to some operators, how could they be
warranted?
It concerned me that completion of the Conformity Question-
naire could presume the operators' acceptance in that existing
policies did not extend to provide cover for date recognition
26 LAUA Note, supra note 16.
(7 h. at 2.
28 Lloyds Aviation Underwriters' Assoc. & Aviation Insurance Offices Assoc.,
Date Recognition Exclusion Clause AVN2000, Apr. 22, 1998 [hereinafter
AVN 2000].
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problems and that they would accept incorporation of AVN2000
in future policies.
A subsequent version of the Conformity Questionnaire, 2 ' now
entitled Application for (Date) Recognition Limited Coverage
Clause, was toned down and had the warranty and basis state-
ment removed altogether. However, the questions were sub-
stantially unchanged, and the document still indicated that
insurers considered responses "material to their decision to is-
sue" an AVN2000 endorsement."' It is mildly amusing, given the
new title of the document, that operators were to "apply" to
have their cover substantially limited.
The proposed AVN2000 Date Recognition Exclusion Clause
was extremely broad and applied to claims arising from the fail-
ure or inability of computer equipment to process any change of
date, year, or time. It applied across the entire coverage given
under aviation policies. Even if Y2K failures themselves were not
fortuities, the LAUA view, AVN2000 contained wording poten-
tially wide enough to exclude cover for computer problems even
if not related to Y2K, for example, damage due to computer vi-
ruses. Much of the wording was of very wide effect. AVN2000
was particularly onerous in that it extended not only to failures
of computer equipment in the operator's possession, but also to
that in the possession of any third party supplier from which the
operator took services (such as travel agents, flight planning or-
ganizations, meteorological providers, air traffic control) and to
the actions of third parties. While those exposures may have
been able to be managed when negotiating arrangements with
third parties, or by amendment to existing contracts, ultimately,
the operator had no real control over such third parties and
would have been far better protected by having insurance cover-
age with respect of their own exposure in relation to such
matters.
Although AVN2000 was a practical fait accompli, it was pro-
posed, depending on responses to the Conformity Question-
naire, to provide the limited writebacks in AVN2001 and
AVN2002 "for crucial coverage linked solely to hull damage and
liability arising out of an accident to an aircraft."'3 1 It was never
entirely clear what the distinction between AVN2001 and 2002
29 See Lloyds Aviation Underwriter's Assoc. & Aviation Insurance Offices Assoc.,
Application for (Date) Recognition Limited Coverage Clause, Sept. 10, 1998.
30 Id.
31 LAUA note p.2.
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was intended to be. The LAUA Note stated that the original
(April 22, 1998) version of AVN2001 was "applicable to aircraft
operators policies" and AVN2002 to "all other aviation/aero-
space liability policies. '3 2 A subsequent note from a LAUA Y2K
committee member suggested that AVN2001 applied to aircraft
operations and AVN2002 applied to non-aircraft operations.
The final versions (October 22, 1998) of the writebacks de-
scribed themeselves as "applicable to hull and aircraft liability
coverage" (AVN2001) and to "non aircraft liability only"
(AVN2002).33 Although the theme was consistent, some confu-
sion was created.
However, the scheme of AVN2000 and AVN2001/AVN2002
removed and did not restore the already existing coverage in a
number of areas. The original AVN2001 appeared to reinstate
coverage under aviation policies in respect of:
accidental loss of or damage to insured aircraft;
accidental bodily injury or death of passengers directly caused by
an accident to an insured aircraft;
loss of or damage to baggage and personal articles of passengers,
mail and cargo directly caused by an accident to an insured air-
craft; and
accidental bodily injury and death and accidental damage to
property directly caused by an insured aircraft or any person or
object falling therefrom. 4
AVN2001 was subsequently modified, and the final version
was improved in part by deleting the term "directly" in the above
terms of coverage, thus marginally widening the writeback.
AVN2002 appeared to reinstate the coverage for sums an in-
sured entity was liable to pay (including costs awarded against it)
in respect of accidental bodily injury, fatal or otherwise, or loss
of or damage to property caused by an aircraft accident.
AVN2002 never used the term "directly" caused by an aircraft
accident.
The original versions of the endorsements contained identical
provisos in respect of coverage, making it clear, for example,
that coverage was not available under the endorsement for
grounding and/or loss of use of an aircraft which had not been
32 LAUA Note, supra note 16.
'3 See Lloyds Aviation Underwriters' Assoc. & Aviation InsUrance Offices Assoc.,
Date Recognition Exclusion Clauses AVN2002, Apr. 22, 1998 [hereinafter
AVN2002].
34 AVN2001, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
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physically damaged or destroyed in the accident giving rise to a
claim under the policy (proviso 2)." This proviso was subse-
quently expanded in different terms in each writeback, further
limiting writeback coverage in respect of loss of use of "prop-
erty" (previously "aircraft") and, in the case of AVN2002, also in
respect of coverage in excess of scheduled underlying insurance
and/or in respect of non-aviation risks.
Proviso 1 stated that coverage provided pursuant to the
AVN2001/2002 was subject to the terms and conditions of the
policy, and nothing in the endorsements extended coverage be-
yond that provided by the policy. 6 This was not changed in sub-
sequent versions.
Proviso 3 incorporated by reference the answers, statements,
and information given in the Conformity Questionnaire, and
rather broadly warranted the truth of such matters and that no
material information had been omitted. 7 This set up warran-
ties concerning material matters to the possible detriment of the
insured, but was amended in later versions (which also incorpo-
rated the original proviso 4 into proviso 3) toning down the stri-
dency and arguably ameliorating the effect.
Proviso 4 introduced a continuing obligation to disclose in
writing any additional material or facts relating to date recogni-
tion conformity of the insured's operations, equipment, and
products, and provides that "[iun the event of such disclosure,
the coverage provided by this Endorsement shall terminate au-
tomatically."38 The apparent result of this proviso was that if fur-
ther information concerning date recognition conformity was
discovered and quite properly (and by obligation) made known
to insurers, the AVN2001/2002 coverage would be lost. (Simi-
larly, it would be lost if the information was not made known to
the insurers). It was my view that this could not have been the
real intention of proviso 4. These elements were deleted, and
proviso 4 was combined with proviso 3 in subsequent versions.
Proviso 5 excluded coverage of other parties having an inter-
est in the policy, particularly pursuant to AVN67B or other lease
finance endorsements, in the event of breach of provisos 3 and
4 by the insured airline." Such gap in coverage had the poten-
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tial to trigger an act of default under common aircraft financing
arrangements. Proviso 5 was deleted from the final versions of
AVN2001 and 2002.
A quick review of a major operator's aviation hull and liability
policy wording suggested that, except to the extent that certain
of the following relate to accidental loss of or damage to an in-
sured aircraft, at least the original AVN2001 did not write back
cover for: personal injury as defined; bodily injury not due to an
aircraft accident (discussed further below); property damage
other than as specified; disappearance of aircraft; loss of use due
to loss of technical records (an area of particular Y2K expo-
sure);"' the innocent operator provision; aircraft spares; aircrew
baggage (other than as passengers); certain additional ex-
penses; shops and restaurants; certain excess liabilities; and
AVN67B protection.4'
Some of the above, such as AVN67B in respect of aircraft fi-
nancing arrangements, may have been covered by the final ver-
sion of AVN2001 (specifically the deletion of proviso 5), but
others remained an issue.
Similar considerations applied in respect of AVN2002 except
that it appeared to apply to liabilities "caused by an aircraft acci-
dent" (as opposed to an accident involving an insured aircraft as
in AVN2001). The final version of AVN2002 also wrote back
cover "caused by an accident, other than an aircraft accident" in
certain circumstances. 2
As indicated, AVN2001 and 2002 were subsequently modified
to some extent to take account of realities, but many of the
above initial concerns were not eliminated.
Effective on January 20, 1996, Part IVA of the CAA required
Australian charter and RPT operators and international opera-
tors serving Australia to carry insurance of at least $A500,000
(for domestic operations) and SDR260,000 (for international
operations) in respect of death or injury of all of their passen-
gers, but not for baggage or cargo claims. Further, it severely
limited the underwriters' ability to refuse indemnity even in the
face of policy breaches by operators (at least in respect of poli-
cies the proper law of which was that of Australia). Operators
cannot carry passengers to which Parts II (Warsaw/Hague), III
(Warsaw), or IV (domestic or non-Convention international car-
,0 See AVN200 1, supra note 34.
4 1 See id.
42 See AVIN2002, supra note 35.
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riage) of the CAA apply unless there is an "acceptable contract
of insurance" in force with an appropriate insurer."
An "acceptable contract of insurance" is one in respect of
which the carrier has obtained from its insurers a declaration
that the policy complies with the CAA, submits the declaration
to CASA, and obtains from it a certificate stating that CASA is
satisfied that the policy meets the "prescribed requirements" of
the CAA, one of which is that the insurer's liability to indemnify
is not affected by "any breach of a safety-related requirement
imposed by or under any Act or by the Civil Aviation Safety Au-
thority."44 Obviously, this provision is of major significance to
underwriters.
Furthermore, an insurer cannot rely on any warranty or exclu-
sion in the policy or any breach of the contract of insurance by
the carrier except as provided in the regulations. The allowable
exclusions are: the standard Aviation Radioactive Contamina-
tion Exclusion clause (General), AVN38; the standard Noise and
Pollution and Other Perils Exclusion clause, AVN46B; the stan-
dard War, Hijacking, and Other Perils Exclusion clause (Avia-
tion), AVN48B; liability for employees of a carrier travelling in
the course of their employment; and liability for passengers not
traveling in a type of aircraft notified to CASA and endorsed on
the policy."'
In summary, the insurer cannot rely on any warranty or exclu-
sion in the policy or any breach of the insurance contract by the
carrier except for the above exclusions allowed by the regula-
tions pursuant to the CAA. Accordingly, AVN2000, standing
alone without writeback, would clearly offend Part IVA and
could not be relied upon by insurers to deny indemnity for lia-
bility under the CAA for death or personal injuries suffered by a
passenger carried by air. AVN2000 did not fit within any of the
exclusions allowed by the CAA and regulations, and would be
defeated by section 41D 46 of the CAA and, possibly, by other
provisions of Part IVA.
43 CAA § 41E, supra note 1. For general background and discussion of the
legislation, see Tony Pyne, Fifteen Years of Developments in Air Carrier Legal Liability,
(1997) 46 Z.L.W. 68, 90. See also Tony Pyne, Developments in Australian Carriers'
Liability Legislation, [1996-97] TAQ 78 .
'.1 CAA § 41C(4) (a), supra note 12. Similar provisions exist in the United
States, Canada, and Switzerland.
45, See id. § 41D.
,16 See infra note 1 and accompanying text.
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More problematic, however, is whether any policy containing
such provision (without write-back) would render an operator's
policy, in respect of passenger aviation legal liabilities, not to be
an "acceptable contract of insurance" for the purposes of Part
IVA. In such a case, section 41E would operate to prohibit the
operator from carrying passengers for fear of breaching and
possibly losing its AOC, as well as fear of prosecution. Given the
definitions of "contract of insurance" and "personal injury liabil-
ity" in section 41B of Part IVA,47 read with section 41C(7),'4 8 I
consider a policy with AVN2000 endorsed cannot be an "accept-
able contract of insurance." A similar result would occur if the
view was taken that AVN2000 (indirectly) amounted to a provi-
sion which enabled insurers to deny indemnity for breach of a
safety related requirement imposed by an Act or by CASA.49
Section 41D refers to "insurers liability ... to indemnify the
carrier against personal injury liability to the extent mentioned in
subsection 41C(3)"5 ° ($A500,000 for domestic carriage and
SDR260,000 for international carriage). The preferable inter-
pretation of these words suggests that section 41D only has ef-
fect to the section 41C(3) limits and that, considering that many
carriers have voluntarily agreed to increased or unlimited liabil-
ity for death or injury of passengers, underwriters could rely on
breaches of warranties or exclusions to deny indemnity for
claims exceeding $A500,000/SDR260,000 with or without the
writebacks. This would involve a gap in coverage which did not
offend the CAA.
For the above reasons, I anticipated that the Australian au-
thorities would resist approving, for the purposes of Part IVA, a
policy containing AVN2000. The actual developments in this re-
gard are discussed further below.
Would the AVN2001/2002 writeback clauses assist? Original
and final versions of both did so, but not to the full extent
necessary.
AVN2001 provided a writeback for "accidental bodily injury
(fatal or otherwise) to passengers [directly] caused by an accident to
an Insured Aircraft."5 AVN2002 wrote back liability "in respect of
accidental bodily injury (fatal or otherwise)... caused by an air-
47 See CAA § 41B, supra note 12.
4. See id. § 41C(7).
49 See id. § 41C(4) (a).
50 Id. § 41D (emphasis added).
51 AVN2001, supra note 34 (emphasis added).
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craft accident.'5 2 Liabilities, for which non-voidable coverage is
required for passengers under Part IVA, are wider than that
"caused by an accident to an Insured Aircraft" (AVN2001) and
that "caused by an aircraft accident" (AVN2002), although the
latter may, on one interpretation, cover accidents relating to an
aircraft, but not involving an aircraft. The Warsaw and related
Conventions in the CAA and Part IV concerning domestic car-
riage extend to death or injury of passengers by accident on
board an aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. These circumstances are far
broader than those involving an accident to an aircraft itself.
In addition, Part IV of the CAA, referring to domestic car-
riage, applies to "personal injury" of passengers, which is wider
than the "bodily injury" referred to in AVN2001 and AVN2002
(and defined "for the avoidance of doubt" in AVN2002).
Further perceived difficulties involved the use of the term "ac-
cidental" in the writebacks and some aspects of the original
provisos 1, 3, 4, and 5.
In order for a policy with AVN2000, even with the writebacks,
to remain an "acceptable contract of insurance," the writebacks
needed to be broadened to cover passenger death or injury in
all circumstances covered by the CAA or AVN2000, with or with-
out the writebacks, need to be expressed as subordinate to the
CAA or be excluded from the ambit of Part IVA. However, the
latter solution would leave carriers without adequate insurance
coverage in certain areas even with the writebacks in place.
An example of the type of Y2K situation that could have fallen
outside coverage under a policy with AVN2000 and AVN2001
would be one in which a passenger was boarding an aircraft and,
due to a Y2K-related malfunction, the aerobridge retracted as
he/she stepped off it, and the passenger fell to the tarmac and
was injured. As the passenger was boarding the aircraft, the air-
52 AVN2002, supra note 35 (emphasis added).
5- See Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991); Georgeopoulos &
Anor. v. American Airlines, Inc. (1984) 1 A.S.L.R. 38, rev'd in American Airlines,
Inc. v. Georgeopoulos & Anor., New South Wales Court of Appeal, Sept. 26, 1996
(unreported); Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines (1997) 42 N.S.W.L.R. 110; South
Pacific Air Motive Pty. Ltd. and Anor. v. Magnus and Anor., (1998) 157 A.L.R.
443. See also Tony Pyne, Comment on Georgeopoulos & Anor. v. American Airlines,
Inc., [1994] 1 A.S.L.R. 110. Johnston: Australian Court Holds that Damages for Pure
Psychological Injury not Recoverable in Warsaw Convention Cases (1997) 16 AVIATION
INSURANCE AND LAW 166. Johnston & Pyne, Recent Developments in Australian Avia-
tion Law [1998] TAQ 142 at 144 ff. Abeyratne, Mental Injury Caused in Accidents
During International Carriage - A Point of View [1999] TAQ 206.
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line would be liable, but there would be no coverage under a
policy with AVN2000 and AVN2001. This also illustrates why the
policy would not be an "acceptable contract of insurance" (with
all the ramifications that entails) unless AVN2000 was aban-
doned or AVN2001 broadened. The final version of AVN2002
may extend coverage sufficiently, but that endorsement is ex-
pressed to relate to "non Aircraft Liability only" and may not
have been added to an operator's policy.
Accordingly, subject to the above in respect of AVN2000, even
with the AVN2001/2002 writebacks, carriers would have re-
mained exposed in effect to certain passenger claims although
section 41D of the CAA could have been expected to operate to
prevent insurers from denying those claims (at least up to the
section 41C(3) levels) as the CAA and regulations then stood.
Similar limitations are included in respect of passenger baggage
and cargo, and these did not enjoy the Part IVA protections.
Naturally, all of the above caused consternation to Australia's
major carriers, and political and regulatory authorities. Interest-
ingly, one of Australia's major carriers had a preference for us-
ing Part IVA to render AVN2000 on relevant policies
unenforceable, whereas the preferred approach of the other was
to go along with AVN2000 while ensuring that the writebacks
fully restored cover so as not to offend Part VA. As we shall see,
the latter course ultimately prevailed.
On April 19, 1999, the U.S. Department of Transportation is-
sued a notice regarding Y2K aviation insurance issues. Although
it was ambiguous and unclear in many respects, it did state in
heavy type: "We wish to make clear, however, that the Depart-
ment has not approved any insurance arrangement for Y2K-re-
lated problems that does not provide continuous coverage
meeting the minimum coverage requirements set forth in Part
205 [of the Federal Aviation Regulations].'
However, it made it clear that its Y2K prohibition only applied
to the minimum amount of coverage required under Part 205.
Typically, Australia adopted a novel approach. Effective Au-
gust 12, 1998, the AVN2000 endorsement was included as an
allowable exclusion under the Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability)
Regulations 1998. 55 However, such inclusion was self-canceling
on August 19, 1999, a couple of days prior to the first significant
54 Notice from United States Department of Transportation, Apr. 19, 1999
[hereinafter Notice].
55 See Civil Aviation (Carriers' Liability) Regulations 1998 (Commonwealth).
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date recognition problem milestone of August 21, 1999 relating
to GPS. This approach allowed AVN2000 to be added to poli-
cies, thereby enabling such policies to continue to be "accept-
able contract(s) of insurance" for the purposes of Part IVA, but
being self-canceling before AVN2000 would effectively "bite." It
was adopted to accommodate insurers' insistence on adding
AVN2000 to policies, while giving authorities time to decide how
to proceed.
Of course, CASA was heavily involved in discussions regarding
the way to proceed. The issue was one of the most difficult pol-
icy and legal questions which had arisen for some time. There
was much seesawing of positions, and misinformation
abounded. Options considered included continuing to accept
AVN2000 as a permissible exclusion after August 21, 1999, on
condition that it was accompanied by AVN2001 (an option sug-
gested by LAUA), or just allowing the AVN2000 Part IVA protec-
tion to disappear in August. The latter could have led to the
Australian Part IVA endorsement AVN57A 56 and equivalents ei-
ther (a) taking precedence over AVN2000 and requiring insur-
ers to cover millennium bug incidents, or (b) not doing so, in
which case there would be no coverage for such incidents and
operators would not have "acceptable contract(s) of insurance"
with all the ramifications that entailed.
The latter was not a feasible scenario, but the distinction be-
tween it and the first scenario turned on whether AVN57A in
policies had the effect of overriding and effectively rendering
useless any AVN2000 endorsement (whether with or without the
writebacks) on Australian operators' policies.
CASA obtained several legal opinions, initially to the effect
that it should refrain from issuing a certificate under section
41C(7) of the CAA (1) when a policy was endorsed with both
AVN57A and AVN2000 in their forms as of July 1998 because it
was not clear that the former would prevail over the latter, and
(2) when a policy was endorsed with both AVN57A and
AVN2000, together with either of AVN2001 or AVN2002, be-
cause the latter did not go far enough to ensure that all liability
required by the CAA would be insured.
56 AVN57A is the London endorsement on policies included to ensure they
comply with Part IVA of the CAA. Other wordings to similar effect, although not
identical, prepared by me are used by Australia's two major local aviation
insurers.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
However, the view was taken that CASA would be justified in
issuing a section 41C(7) certificate (1) where a policy was en-
dorsed with AVN57A and an amended form of AVN2000, which
provided that the former prevailed over the latter or (2) where a
policy was endorsed with AVN57A, AVN2000 and an amended
form of AVN2001 or 2002, where those amendments had the
effect of ensuring coverage in compliance with the CAA.
The above legal advice, confirmatory advice from another
firm, and my own view was that it was far from certain that a
court would interpret endorsement AVN57A as prevailing over
AVN2000 for a number of reasons. First, the very existence of
endosements AVN2001 and AVN2002 implied that AVN2000 was
thought otherwise to prevail over AVN57A. Second, AVN57A
was drafted in the language of a grant of coverage with a series
of operative clauses and some exclusions, but AVN2000 was de-
scribed as and drafted in the language of an exclusion clause.
The various versions of AVN2001 and AVN2002 purported to
modify the operation of AVN2000, but were in some places re-
cited (including in the title) as grants of coverage. Finally,
much depended on the location and timing of the various provi-
sions in the policy. For example, if AVN57A was written into the
body of the policy and AVN2000 was an endorsement, principles
of construction would suggest that the latter would override the
former and vice versa. Similarly, if AVN2000 was a subsequent
addition to a policy containing AVN57A, general principles of
construction would suggest that it was intended to modify
AVN57A.
In or about June 1999, CASA notified AOC holders that the
government had decided that the temporary AVN2000 provision
in the Civil Aviation Regulations (Carriers' Liability) would not
be extended beyond the August 19, 1999 cutoff date. The gov-
ernment's decision followed the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation's announcement that the United States would not
approve passenger liability insurance coverage for airlines where
insurance policies contained date recognition exclusions.17 Ac-
cordingly, it was stated that CASA would not issue certificates of
compliance under the Act in relation to contracts of insurance
containing AVN2000 or similar exclusions for a period ex-
tending beyond August 19, 1999 because, in CASA's opinion,
AVN2001 did not adequately write back the exclusions con-
57 See Notice, supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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tained in AVN2000. What was not mentioned in the letter was
the concern that AVN57A did not override AVN2000.
As can be imagined, the CASA letter caused some consterna-
tion. LAUA took the view that it was always the intention that
policies issued in the London market would comply with Austra-
lian law and that insurers believed it was quite clear that
AVN57A overrode AVN2000. LAUA considered that the history
of AVN57A showed that insurers accepted from the outset that
its terms overrode all others in the policy relating to passenger
legal liability and up to the limits required by the relevant legis-
lation. It was further stated that if AVN2001 was attached with
AVN2000, the full coverage required by the legislation would be
in effect, including, if not already provided by the policy, the
required personal injuries coverage by reason of paragraph 5 of
AVN57A. While I accept the bona fides of the market, I do not
accept the latter contention as at all clear.
A London market wording guru indicated that he found
CASA's legal advice strange in that AVN2000/2001/2002 would
be added to any policies at their renewal date and, as such, be-
come part of such policies, whereas AVN57A was and would al-
ways remain an endorsement, "reattached" for each policy
period. As such, it would remain a "clause paramount." Ex-
pressed in those terms, this view is correct but AVN2000 and
AVN2001 appear to be endorsements and would arguably be
paramount if (1) AVN57A was part of the policy and was overrid-
den by such endorsements, or (2) the AVN57A and the
AVN2000 series were all endorsements, but the latter were ad-
ded at a date after AVN57A.
The impasse continued until late in the day when the Austra-
lian Government Solicitor provided an opinion to the effect that
AVN57A overrode AVN2000 and the writebacks, and that CASA
could issue a certificate under section 41C(7) of the Act in re-
spect of policies containing both clauses. This conclusion was
assisted by reference to section 41D, which prevented insurers
from relying on any exclusions not permitted by the CAA or
Regulations.
Although I remained concerned that AVN57A would not over-
ride AVN2000 in all circumstances, I was content to rely on the
Australian Government Solicitor's opinion for practical pur-
poses. In reliance on that opinion, CASA continued to issue sec-
tion 41C(7) certificates for policies with AVN57A, AVN2000, and
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AVN2001 endorsements for coverage on and after August 20,
1999.5x
However, from an operator's point of view, section 41G(b) of
the CAA should be kept in mind. That provision enables under-
writers, who make payments to passengers under the policy,
which they would not otherwise have had to make except for the
effect of Part IVA, to recover such amounts from the operator.
As far as I am aware, this provision has not yet been utilized, and
it has some difficulties, but it will be interesting to see whether
any claims under it arise in connection with Y2K issues.
Speaking of claims, lest you think that the poor old lawyers
have missed out on a Y2K failure litigation bonanza with lucra-
tive pickings, a legal action has been commenced in the UK
against computer consultants for allegedly exaggerating the Y2K
threat and putting in place an unnecessarily expensive fix.
Other foreshadowed legal actions are insurance disputes for
remediation costs, warranty claims over contractual representa-
tions, shareholder claims against boards of directors for spend-
ing too much on Y2K, and shareholder claims against boards of
directors for spending too little on Y2K. I'm sure my legal
brethren will come up with others.
1998 and 1999 were interesting for me and many others in
relation to Y2K and related issues. Thankfully, four of the signif-
icant dates have now passed with a whimper rather than a bang,
and although some problems have arisen and more can be ex-
pected, the hope and prediction is that they will be minor. In
an aviation context in particular, the Y2K experience has seen a
truly global industry pull together to avert potential disaster,
gain experience for future disaster planning on a global basis,
and build confidence. Y2K prompted the first integrated global
contingency plan, the model for which can be used to address
future global issues.
5 The AGS opinion correctly noted that AVN2001 does not fully meet the re-
quirements of the Act, and a policy with AVN2000 and AVN2001 would not be an
"acceptable contract of insurance" unless AVN57A was also included.
59 See clause 6 of AVN57A.
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